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Abstract
This article provides an overview of the developments about
the armed on-board protection of Dutch vessels under
Dutch law. The Dutch position has changed over the years.
In 2011, the starting point was that private security compa-
nies (PSCs) are not to be allowed. It was expected that ade-
quate protection of Dutch vessels could be provided by ves-
sel protection detachments (VPDs). Although not consid-
ered as an absolute statutory bar, the state monopoly on
force was considered the main argument against PSCs. After
optimising the use of VPDs and given the development in
other countries, the approach changed into a ‘VPS, unless
…’-approach. Under the new Protection of Merchant Ship-
ping Act that is expected to come into force in the second
half of 2019, PSCs can be employed only if no VPS is avail-
able. This article gives an overview of the argumentation in
this change of view over the years. It also explores the
headlines, criteria and procedures of the new law and some
other topics, including the position of the master under the
upcoming law. In line with the other country reports, it ena-
bles the comparative study in the last article of this special
issue.
Keywords: vessel protection, private armed guards, state
monopoly on force, masters position, state control
1 Introduction
The scope and nature of the threat of piracy to the large
fleet of Dutch merchant vessels has been the topic of
political debate since 2011 between the Netherlands
government and Parliament.1 The main question in the
discussion was whether to allow armed private security
companies (PSCs) on board Dutch merchant vessels,
and if yes, under what conditions and restrictions.
Deploying armed PSCs on board Dutch sea vessels has
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1. G. Scott-Smith and M. Janssen, ‘Holding on to the Monopoly on Vio-
lence? The Use of Armed Force, the Dutch Approach to PMSCs, and
the Anti-Piracy Case’, St. Anthony’s International Review, at 54-70
(2014) provide for an overview of discussions up to 2013.
always been, and on the date of finalisation of this article
in March 2019 it still is, prohibited by law. This is so,
despite the threat of piracy in its peak years, 2010 and
2011, and despite the fact that companies around the
world provide armed security services for seagoing ves-
sels. Theoretically, an attack against a Dutch vessel,
with a lot of media attention, could have affected the
discussion, but there has been no such attack. Neverthe-
less, there has been a constant discussion in the Nether-
lands about whether PSCs should be permitted. Sup-
ported by vessel owners and other organisations, and the
argument that the Dutch merchant fleet will become
less competitive, the calls for allowing PSCs on board
Dutch vessels have become stronger over the years. An
important rationale underlying this gradual change of
mind is that there is an increasing number of flag states
in Europe that by law allow on-board PSCs. In the
Netherlands, an amendment of law is required to allow
armed PSCs on board Dutch vessels. Such amendment
is expected to be enacted in the near future because a
bill on this subject has (already) passed the Netherlands
Parliament (in March 2019), but the bill has not come
into force yet. The strong debate in the two Houses of
Parliament2 focused on issues of legal substance and val-
idity of the proposed provisions and centred on this
question of law: does the bill provide enough and ade-
quate provisions for the Dutch government to allow
PSCs? Even when the bill will be enacted as an Act of
Parliament, many of its provisions will require further
regulation by regulations thereunder3 before the first
armed PSC will be allowed to board a Dutch vessel. In
addition, as long as there is no imminent threat of pira-
cy, there is no need for a rapid enactment.4 And even if
the amendment enters into force, it will allow deploying
PSCs under very strict conditions. Until such time, the
2. The Dutch Parliament, the States-General, is bicameral consisting of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. A bill has to pass both cham-
bers. A majority in each of the two chambers may accept a bill. Only
the House of Representatives can initiate or amend a bill.
3. The Act of Parliament may provide (and the accepted bill does provide
as we will see) that matters be further regulated by Order in Council,
which is legislation of a lower order than an Act of Parliament. An
Order in Council is issued by Royal Decree. Parliament may require to
be informed before the Order is promulgated, as it did for almost all of
the Orders prescribed by the legislative proposal.
4. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and International Maritime
Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Report for the
Period 1 January-31 December 2017 (London, 2018), available at:
https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/request-piracy-report.
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Netherlands will continue to rely exclusively on its
armed forces to protect ocean-going vessels – vessel pro-
tection detachments (VPDs). The amendment will
change the exclusive nature of VPD protection, but its
approach will remain ‘VPD, unless …’.
This article will discuss the arguments raised in the
political debate in the Netherlands on deploying PSCs
on board Dutch vessels. Given the absence of practical
experience with PSCs on board of Dutch vessels, we
will describe the contents of the legislative proposal in
the bill as accepted by Parliament. This article will then
highlight the rationales underlying the ‘VPD, unless …’
approach. We will also discuss how the legislator plans
for the system to work when PSCs take firearms on
board and, in the worst case, are required to shoot
hijackers of their vessels.
2 Statutory Background – An
Overview of Arguments
2.1 For the Time Being Current Situation
The traditional and for the time being current regulato-
ry framework in the Netherlands has three particular
features. First, current law does allow for the master of a
vessel to have two handguns on board but prohibits pos-
session of more or heavier firearms. This option obvi-
ously falls short to meet the threat of modern piracy.
Second, the possession or use of these weapons on board
may constitute a criminal offense, such as a violation of
the gun control laws (possession of guns on board) or, if
firearms are used, (attempted) murder or aggravated
assault under the Dutch Criminal Code. The govern-
ment has stated that masters and vessel owners will be
prosecuted if they violate these laws. There has not yet
been any criminal prosecution, although there have been
rumours that some Dutch vessels in fact have private
security guards on board. In extreme cases, such viola-
tions of Dutch criminal law may cause the government
to deregister the Dutch vessel involved. Third, if the
master and crew, however, use force against pirates
attacking their vessel, they may argue self-defence or
necessity when prosecuted. In its judgment of 23 Octo-
ber 1984 the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that
prohibited weapons were used in self-defence does not
in itself imply that the defendant is barred from arguing
self-defence. The mere fact that a master chooses to
navigate a piracy-prone area is arguably not enough to
deny him the defence of self-defence or necessity for
being at fault. On the other hand, as long as there is no
imminent threat or attack, there is no need for self-
defence. Therefore, self-defence cannot serve as a justi-
fication for possessing firearms on board Dutch vessels
because of fear or the possibility of a pirate attack, where
such possession is a violation of gun control laws. In
addition, as we will see in the following, this justifica-
tion is not used in the upcoming legislation.
2.2 The 2011 Advisory Committee on Armed
Private Security against Piracy and the
Government’s Response: ‘VPDs Only (for
Now)’
Against the backdrop of the piracy threat, the Dutch
government was forced to take a stand in 2011 as to
whether it would allow armed private security guards on
board Dutch vessels. The government decided to sub-
mit the question to the Advisory Committee on Armed
Private Security against Piracy (‘Advisory Commit-
tee’).5 The Advisory Committee issued its recommenda-
tions in August 2011.6 Although it didn’t expressly rule
out any possibility of deploying armed private security
on board Dutch vessels, it did so preliminarily, thus
leaving room for future developments. The government
subsequently endorsed this position and so did a majori-
ty of Parliament. The Advisory Committee and the gov-
ernment based their assessment on the following argu-
ments.
2.2.1 State Monopoly on Force
First, both the Advisory Committee and the govern-
ment gave much importance to the principle of the
state’s monopoly on violence, which is a fundamental
principle under Dutch public and private law holding
that the legitimate use of force by the state cannot be
exercised by private entities. There are several reasons
for their emphasis on this principle, which echoes deep
religious beliefs and philosophies of Dutch politics and
society. However, the government’s 2011 decision to
hold off PSCs also implies – consistent with the Adviso-
ry Committee’s reasoning – that the government
believes the state monopoly on force is not an absolute
statutory bar to accepting the use of armed private
security on board Dutch vessels. It is not a bar in other
countries either.
2.2.2 Importance of Criminal Prosecution of Pirates
Second, in its decision to hold off the Dutch govern-
ment also analysed the rest of its efforts to combating
piracy. State action by Dutch armed forces on board
Dutch merchant vessels could also promote the interna-
tional rule of law. The Dutch Constitution requires the
government to do so.7 For that reason, it is important to
seek criminal prosecution of piracy as the crime of
hijacking individual vessels8 as well as a form of interna-
tional organised crime. Serious efforts need to be made
to locate and prosecute the upper echelons of pirate
groups as criminal organisations: the clients, financiers
and intermediaries. Criminal prosecution means arrest-
5. The author was a member of that Committee.
6. The Dutch report contains a summary in English, available at: https://
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2011/09/01/rapport-
commissie-de-wijkerslooth-geweldsmonopolie-en-piraterij. There was
an earlier advice of the Advisory Council on International Affairs to
allow PSCs: https://aiv-advies.nl/download/045f9ea5-c9f0-4bb6-a3c0-
bc190e56dbaa.pdf.
7. Section 90 of the Dutch Constitution provides: ‘The Government shall
promote the development of the international legal order.’
8. Punishable under Section 381 of the Dutch Criminal Code and applica-
ble on the basis of universal jurisdiction (Section 4 of the Dutch Criminal
Code).
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ing and bringing charges against hijackers, preferably in
the region but, if necessary, also in the Netherlands.
This is an important (international) obligation which
VPDs deployed on board Dutch vessels are better able
to organise than PSCs who merely want to save the ves-
sel. Courts in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe
have gained some experience with this type of prosecu-
tion.9 The more the Netherlands, together with other
countries, can and actually does contribute to combating
piracy under international criminal law, the more reason
it has to not deploy PSCs as an immediate and unavoid-
able necessity due to the situation on certain navigation
routes. State action against pirates in general is impor-
tant in this discussion. In this regard, the Netherlands
appears to do or wants to do more than many other
countries.
2.2.3 Importance of Other Means of Protection
Third, in 2011, the government relied on methods other
than PSCs to protect Dutch vessels, one particular
method being the consistent and proper implementation
of Best Management Practices. These include safety
measures on board, convoy shipping and joining group
transits through the International Recommended
Transit Corridor, as well as shipping under the protec-
tion of patrolling navy vessels in dangerous seas within
the framework of the EU Atlanta mission and the
NATO Ocean Shield mission. This argument is sup-
ported by the view that the Dutch state is not required
to guarantee protection for every risk that every Dutch
vessel may encounter on routes anywhere in the world.
There is no duty to permit a PSC for each journey with
a possible risk for a piracy attack.
2.2.4 Navy Deployment to Be Optimised First
The last argument of the Advisory Committee and the
Dutch government’s decision not to allow armed private
security guards on board Dutch vessels in 2011 was that
the use of armed private security guards was not neces-
sary. They argued that military VPDs by the Royal
Netherlands Navy could provide sufficient and ade-
quate security for individual vessels. One specific
rationale was the lack of practical experience in 2011
with deploying VPD for security purposes. At that time,
there still was no clarity as to the scope of protection
and the number of military VPDs. Before the decision
to allow PSCs could be made, VPD deployment had to
be optimised first. Since 2011, VPD protection has been
optimised and made more flexible and less expensive
over the years. As we will see, the answer to the ques-
tion whether peak flexibility has been reached in 2018
has in recent years been an important factor in the
changing approach towards PSCs.
9. Several cases have been brought before Dutch criminal courts, challeng-
ing several aspects of substantive and procedural criminal law, but lead-
ing to convictions under national law.
2.3 The 2017 Bill for the Protection of Merchant
Shipping Act
The government and Parliament initially argued that
the use of PSC could not be ruled out but could only be
considered when ‘an adequate level of protection cannot
be offered and the international position of the Nether-
lands is negatively affected’. This allowed them to
reconsider some matters while allowing PSCs on board
Dutch vessels. On 26 April 2013, the government10
issued a new statement to Parliament about deploying
VPDs.11 The government expressed its intention to
draft legislation allowing the use of PSCs. The govern-
ment had a variety of reasons for its new position.
The government continued to emphasise adequate pro-
tection of the merchant fleet by deploying VPDs. How-
ever, one of the most important arguments to allow
PSCs was that, in spite of the downward trend in
deployment of VPDs, the state cannot always meet the
vessel owners’ requirements. The government’s letter
stated that VPDs cannot meet the requirements of the
vessel owners in all cases in terms of flexibility in appli-
cation periods, scope, relative costs or geographical
range. Problems arise particularly in transports that are
part of the spot market. These are transports for which
the destination port only becomes known at a later stage.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense was not prepared
to deviate from the minimum standard size of a VPD of
eleven people. Deviation was possible but required a
drastic (more expensive) change of the deployment con-
cept. As such, the Ministry of Defense could not trans-
port a VPD if the vessel was not suitable to take on a
team of eleven people. Thus, the government’s opinion
in 2013 was that although VPD deployment had been
optimised, their deployment still could not provide
security in all cases. The use of VPDs had therefore
reached its limit, not because of a lack of defence per-
sonnel but because of the size of VPDs, because the time
required to organise VPDs differed and was at times
very short, and because of pricing (the vessel owner’s
private contribution could not be reduced further).
There is yet another argument, however. As the govern-
ment rightly reported in their letter to Parliament, espe-
cially in the years after 2011, many countries, including
many European countries, have passed legislation to
permit the use of PSCs. This fact has contributed to the
shift in political opinion. This change is based on the
fear that the exceptional prohibition of the Netherlands
will affect its merchant fleet’s competitive position.
Such potential negative effect on the competitiveness of
the merchant fleet is a sensitive matter for those Dutch
politicians and members of society who consider the
country’s military and trade history to be heroic. There
was a fear that Dutch ship owners would reflag to a
country that allows PSCs or that makes enough VPDs
10. On 5 December 2012, the government was comprised of liberals and
socialists. The previous government was made up of liberals and Christi-
an democrats. The Minister of Defense was a Christian democrat. Tradi-
tionally, Christian democrats are fierce proponents of the state monop-
oly on force.
11. Parliamentary Papers II, 2012/13, 32 706, 44.
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available. From a legal point of view, it is clear from
developments in some other countries that these coun-
tries considered that there is a legal basis to allow PSCs.
Yet they also considered that it is possible on a PSC cer-
tification framework to provide for proper and effective
rules to control the use of force by PSCs on board. On
these arguments the original, strong argument of the
state’s monopoly of force started to be less articulated in
favour of a more economic approach. It is important to
note, however, that the other countries’ decision to
allow PSCs is based on reasons considered less impor-
tant in the Netherlands. For instance, in some countries
(e.g. Norway, Denmark) there is a major difference
between the size of the merchant fleet and the size of
their navy. In addition, countries have vastly different
legal and cultural opinions about the state’s sole right to
use force (as seems to be the case in the Anglo-Saxon
legal culture). In Germany’s case, the limited deploy-
ment of its navy is based on its history.
All these arguments taken together led the government
to conclude in 2013 that PSCs should be allowed in
addition to VPDs and that legislation had to be passed
to make this possible. However, it is relevant to note
that the government’s change of position is not – as the
Ministers want to make it appear in their above-men-
tioned letter of 26 April 2013 – fully consistent with the
reasoning and conclusions of the 2011 Advisory Com-
mittee’s report or the previous government’s original
position which was based on that report. The govern-
ment made a new and different political decision. This
decision was more than ever before based on the need to
facilitate shipping and the belief that the state has a duty
of care to protect the economic interests of the industry
and the safety of people sailing on Dutch vessels. This
indicates the new – politically different – government
had less reservations about abandoning the state monop-
oly on violence to allow vessel owners to use PSCs. This
belief was a new element in the debate and was based on
notions of international (labour) law, such as Article 94
of the UNCLOS, Article V of the Maritime Labour
Convention and Article 2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR; right to life), in combination
with the doctrine of ‘positive treaty obligations’.
Because the optimised deployment of VPDs and meas-
ures by the vessel owners themselves could no longer
provide adequate security in all categories of transport,
the government considered it necessary to fulfil its duty
of care by creating the appropriate conditions for the use
of PSCs. Note that international law does not strictly
require the state to allow PSCs. The previous govern-
ment also considered the possibility of not sailing at all,
or only at the vessel owner’s risk, instead of allowing the
use of a PSC on board. The state’s duty of care was in
that approach not absolute. In addition, the new govern-
ment became more concerned about economic ramifica-
tions if the Netherlands were to prohibit PCSs while
other countries did not.
Although there is little to be said against the new politi-
cal position, the underlying arguments are not very con-
vincing as compared to those raised in the past. In addi-
tion, it is based on the mere expectation of adequate leg-
islation and implementation practices to facilitate the
use of PSCs. The fact that the government’s arguments
are not convincing is also apparent from Parliament’s
reaction to the government’s new position. In 2013, a
majority in the House of Representatives disagreed it
was necessary to allow PSCs on board Dutch vessels in
addition to VPDs and to pass legislation to do so. Parlia-
ment’s position was based on the same questions that
were raised in the government’s debate: is the use of
PSCs on vessels necessary, given all the other options
for protection? Can the use of VPDs still be further
expanded, for example, by stationing marine forces in
the Gulf of Aden or by cooperating with other EU
countries? Can the size of a VPD be reduced to less than
eleven people, given the fact PSCs as well as other coun-
tries’ military VPDs work with teams of four to six peo-
ple? And what are the consequences of differences in
size? Is piracy moving from the East Coast of Africa to
the West Coast where states do not permit PSCs (and
perhaps not even VPDs) on board vessels in their terri-
torial waters? This question was particularly important:
can legislation be passed which adequately regulates and
provides safeguards for the use of weapons by PSCs on
board? Can the master’s duties in this regard be ade-
quately regulated? Parliament’s response was not entire-
ly negative. However, the questions raised did not con-
vince the majority there was a need to legalise the use of
PSCs, even if only complementary to VPD protection.
Parliament insisted on further investigation while call-
ing for restraint before making irreversible decisions to
allow PSCs on board Dutch vessels.
In December 2015, the Dutch government published
another statement to Parliament. The government
argued that it continued to prefer public security guards
but did not entirely rule out private security guards.12 It
continued to adhere to the principle that VPDs could be
deployed; however, it specifically addressed two excep-
tions. The first exception is the situation that there is
simply no VPD available. Four other exceptions were
described in the government’s opinion as follows:
1. Transportation requiring to navigate 100 NM or
more to reach the entry and exit point of a VPD in
comparison to an entry and exit point of a team of
private security guards.
2. Transportation accompanied by VPDs costs the ves-
sel owner 20 per cent or more than deploying private
security guards.
3. Transportation by a vessel that cannot accommodate
an additional VPD during the period the VPD is on
board.
4. Transportation for use in the spot market where the
planned route and potential detours render VPD
deployment too complicated or impossible.
In these cases, the government’s new approach was that
private security services holding a Netherlands maritime
security license should be allowed on board merchant
12. Ibid., 74.
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vessels, subject to strict conditions. It is clearly a ‘VPD,
unless …’ opinion.
Along this line, two members of the House of Represen-
tatives submitted a bill for the Dutch13 Protection of
Merchant Shipping Act. Their final draft was published
in February 2017.14 It is this bill that, finally, is accepted
by Parliament in March 2019. The bill seeks to elaborate
on the above-mentioned ‘not for now’ PSC approach of
the 2011 Advisory Committee, given that experience
since 2011 has shown the limits of depending solely on
VPDs to protect Dutch vessels in situations that call for
protection. And given the development that more and
more countries have accepted PSCs. The bill aims to
provide adequate security for transports which cannot
be secured by VPD (for lack of space, time or costs) and
to protect the Dutch merchant fleet’s commercial inter-
ests. The bill does so by ensuring that transport prices
match the prices foreign vessel owners pay to protect
their transports. Under this bill, Dutch law will in the
near future permit on-board possession and, if necessa-
ry, use of weapons. The bill sets forth the legal safe-
guards deemed necessary for such deployment. The
bill’s contents and key considerations and issues merit
discussion because it is an indication of the contours of
future law on PSCs in the Netherlands. This will allow
us to judge whether it has the requisite fundamental fea-
tures. Let us therefore turn to the bill in more detail.
3 Key Aspects of the Law
3.1 Background
The bill’s drafters mainly follow the government’s opin-
ion that there are, or better, have become sufficient
arguments in favour of allowing PSCs.15 Their reason
for drafting the bill is the rising number of piracy
attacks and their significant impact on the economy.
The maritime industry plays an important role in the
economy and employment of the Netherlands. Again,
much weight is given to the fact that all European coun-
tries with a strong maritime presence have promulgated
legislation for deploying private maritime security on
board merchant vessels. This affects the competitive-
ness of the Netherlands merchant shipping industry
because Dutch vessel owners pay more than foreign ves-
sel owners to protect their vessels. As a result, they miss
out on business opportunities, because they cannot meet
13. To expedite the process, the bill only relates to the European part of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. One complication is that ships within the
whole Kingdom of the Netherlands fly the Dutch flag, but the Nether-
lands and Curacao use different ship registers. Applying Dutch legisla-
tion to Curacao would require a legislative proposal to go through dif-
ferent legislative processes and to be passed by separate parliaments
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The idea is that Curacao will
make separate but substantially the same provisions as the Dutch law.
By a special provision, the upcoming Dutch bill can eventually be
replaced by a law, applicable to the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a
whole (Rijkswet), but that is not a target as such (Parliamentary Papers
I, 2018/19, D, 6).
14. Parliamentary Papers II 2016/17, 34 558, 5.
15. Ibid., 6.
the security requirements. The drafters argue this
encourages vessels to deregister from Dutch registers
and to fly a different flag. This causes the merchant
shipping industry and related services (e.g. financing,
accounting, repair and maintenance companies, and
maritime lawyers) to leave the Netherlands’ jurisdiction,
making it less attractive to register a vessel under Neth-
erlands law. The drafters argue the playing field could
be levelled again by allowing private security services on
board Dutch merchant vessels, subject to conditions.
This economic argument seems to reflect the shift in the
political opinion from embracing the public law concept
of state monopoly on violence to advocating the necessi-
ty to protect vital economic interests. The approach,
consistent with the government’s position, is that PSCs
should only be allowed if the government cannot pro-
vide VPD protection. PSC protection is only allowed
where it has been previously decided that VPD protec-
tion is not available; PSC protection is only permitted as
a substitute to VPD protection. So: ‘VPD, unless …’
3.2 ‘VPD, Unless …’
It is generally accepted that vessel owners travelling
through high-risk areas are expected to use Best Man-
agement Practices (BMPs) consisting of procedures
with several levels of measurements to prevent pirates
from attacking vessels and boarding the vessel. The use
of all possible BMPs is seen as condition sine qua non for
further protection by VPD or PSC, as the case may be.
In the ‘VPD, unless …’ approach, the use of PSCs is
given a subordinate role. Under the bill, this means that
when a VPD or another form of government protection
is available, the vessel owner must accept that form. The
vessel owner will be eligible to receive private security
services, only if the transport meets the protection crite-
ria and no VPDs are available. The bill’s explanatory
memorandum distinguishes four specific situations that
we already mentioned earlier.
1. Even though VPDs are deployed in more cases, they
cannot always be deployed, especially on the spot
market as we saw earlier. The main impediment is
the difficulty of organising VPD protection on short
notice.
2. The vessel in question has no adequate facilities to
host a VPD of eleven persons.
3. Economic factors of VPD protection would cause
unwarranted changes in the planned navigation route
by ‘more sea miles than a certain amount to be fur-
ther stipulated by the Ministry’.16
4. The costs of engaging VPD protection are dispropor-
tionately higher than PSC protection; the percentage
to be stipulated by the Ministry.17
In these situations, the drafters saw a discrepancy
between the government’s duty to organise protection
(duty of care) and the impossibility of organising such
16. The distance of 100 NM mentioned above in the government’s 2013
memorandum serves as an indication.
17. The 20 per cent figure mentioned above in the government’s 2013
memorandum serves as an indication.
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protection through VPDs. In order to correct the dis-
crepancy, the drafters proposed to allow deploying
armed private security guards only in these situations.
Under this principle of ‘VPD, unless …’, it first has to
be determined whether VPD protection is at all feasible.
The vessel owner must obtain specific permission for
each transport to deploy private security guards. The
vessel owner has no discretion in choosing between
VPD or PSC or in deciding whether based on the above
criteria his situation allows him to do without a VPD.
Under the bill, this judgment is reserved to the Dutch
Coast Guard acting on behalf of the Minister of Justice
and Security. Using a PSC without this previous per-
mission is, as we will see in the following, a separate
criminal act.
Furthermore, the use of PSCs will only be allowed in
dangerous areas. The Ministry will designate these areas
based on the high-risk areas set forth in the ILO’s BMP
document. It also designates so-called Voluntary
Reporting Areas (VRAs).
The deployment of private securers is only allowed by
private services holding a license issued by the Minister
of Justice and Security (issued by the Environmental
and Transportation Inspection). Only ISO
28007-1:2015-certified organisations are eligible for
licenses. (Licenses of other EU countries will be accep-
ted as well as those from other countries that meet cer-
tain criteria.) The license may contain further regula-
tions, such as the requirement of video surveillance and
recording of all activities of the PSC through body cam-
eras or the requirement that the PSC be sufficiently
insured. A license can be suspended or withdrawn by
the Minister.
4 The Use of Force and the
Relation between the Master
and the Guards/Team
Leader
The upcoming bill for the Protection of Merchant Ship-
ping Act addresses the use of force because this is a mat-
ter of domestic law (including criminal law).
4.1 General Legal Background
Despite the political shift from favouring the protection
of vital interests of Dutch economy over the state
monopoly on the use of force, the bill shows Dutch poli-
tics is still reluctant towards armed PSCs. That is the
bill’s legal background. For a proper understanding, we
highlight two important aspects.
The first aspect is that even if the state of the Nether-
lands were to accept PSCs, the state will remain respon-
sible for any use of force on Dutch vessels, based on for
example, the ECHR. Indeed, anyone on board a vessel
sailing under Dutch flag and everything that happens on
board fall under the Netherlands’ jurisdiction, to use the
term of Article 1 of the ECHR. When it comes to using
violence against pirates on board, the Netherlands – as
an ECHR member state – will be responsible for proper
treatment of those pirates harmed by its use of force or
arrested as perpetrators. As such, these people have a
right to adequate medical care, to have any potential
human rights violations investigated and compensated,
especially their right to protection of their life under
Article 2 of the ECHR. They also have due process
rights as suspects, including the right to be promptly
taken before a court or other authority, even if they are
arrested on the high seas, as required under Article 5(3)
of the ECHR. It should be noted that the ECHR recog-
nises that it may take some time to take an arrestee from
the high seas to court. It is settled case law in the Neth-
erlands that all these duties are best discharged by main-
taining the monopoly on force and only allowing the
state’s armed forces (VPDs) on board Dutch vessels.
This will ensure the use of force and its ex post justifica-
tions are clearly and adequately regulated and properly
governed by the rule of law. This was and still is a
strong argument in Dutch politics against the use of
PSCs.
The second aspect concerns the right to self-defence as
a legal defence and is in some way related to the first.
Although the bill for the Protection of Merchant Ship-
ping Act clearly seeks to allow Dutch vessels to protect
themselves against piracy, self-defence is not the under-
lying normative principle of the bill. First of all, as sta-
ted earlier, possession of firearms on board Dutch ves-
sels is a per se violation of law as well as the criminal
provisions of the gun control laws. Under Dutch crimi-
nal law, self-defence is only allowed when there is an
imminent attack or threat thereof. The bill regulates on-
board possession of firearms (while further regulating
proper storage etc.) separately from their eventual use.
The bill thus seeks to enhance the vessel owners’ pro-
tection of their vessels. However, self-defence is not the
underlying legal principle on which the bill’s legal
framework is based. Instead, it is based on the recogni-
tion that we need a system to control possession and – if
necessary – the use of (fire)arms, given that there is a
need for protection in dangerous waters. The bill seeks
to regulate possession and use of firearms on board of
Dutch vessels within the legal framework. Dutch law
recognises self-defence as an exception in very specific
situations where an imminent threat makes it impossible
to abide by the law.
4.2 Specific Provisions
According to the bill, armed private security forces may
use force when performing their maritime security serv-
ices. The bill calls for further, delegated regulation to
indicate which weapons and other means of force are
allowed and how they have to be stored on board. If
there is a threat of piracy, the security forces may carry,
set up and threaten with their designated means of
defence. If the threat continues and there is no other
peaceful way to neutralise the threat, they can use the
appropriate level of force as necessary. However, they
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must issue a warning before using force. They may not
use force simply to kill, although the provision in ques-
tion does not prohibit fatal shootings if absolutely neces-
sary. Here again, the justification is that use of force is
consistent with this particular statute, not that the PSC
acted as required under the specific self-defence provi-
sion of the Dutch Criminal Code.
The maritime security guards are allowed but not
required to arrest pirates when they observe them com-
mitting a crime (according to a general provision in the
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure) and to use hand-
cuffs (according to the bill). Arrestees must be brought
before the vessel’s master, who now acting as a law
enforcement officer, has to proceed as prescribed in the
special provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure
applying to the master. This aspect of Section 10 of the
bill reflects the Dutch approach following the Advisory
Committee’s 2011 report not only to prevent piracy but
also to arrest and prosecute pirates, if necessary in the
Netherlands. It also shows the Netherlands accepts a
certain level of responsibility for pirates on board Dutch
vessels.
The following provisions are relevant in relation to state
oversight and control. Civil servants designated by Min-
isterial Order must ensure compliance with the Act.
The Environmental and Transportation Inspection is
charged with overseeing the maritime security compa-
nies holding maritime security licenses. It must perform
its oversight duty under the auspices of the Minister of
Justice and Security. Because the security services will
also take place outside the territory of the Netherlands,
the oversight duties must be performed on board vessels
docked in the harbours of other countries. In case of any
irregularity, further investigation may follow and
depending on the outcome measures may be taken, such
as fines or revocation or suspension of licenses.
The Economic Crimes Act (in Dutch: ‘Wet op de econ-
omische delicten’) will criminalise violations of the pro-
hibition to offer or perform armed maritime security
activities without a license granted by the Minister, or to
perform, permit or enable armed maritime security
activities on board a vessel without the Minister’s per-
mission. Dutch criminal law allows for prosecution of
legal entities, such as PSC companies. Furthermore, the
master’s failure to report any use of force and use of
handcuffs to the public prosecutor will be criminalised
as well. The penalty for violating these rules is impris-
onment for six months or a fine of the fourth category
(ranging from €8,201 to €20,500).
Upon completion of each transport accompanied by pri-
vate maritime security guards, the master and the head
of PSC each must draft a separate report in the Dutch
or English language as provided in the rules which will
be promulgated by further regulation (Order in Coun-
cil). The reports must state whether and what force or
handcuffs were used. Once the threat of piracy subsides,
the master must promptly report any use of force and
any use of handcuffs by the private maritime security
guards to the public prosecutor.
In this respect, the bill has been amended significantly
on a certain point by the House of Representatives dur-
ing the debate in Parliament in an effort to obtain a par-
liamentary majority in favour of the bill. The relevant
part, Section 11 (paras. 1 and 2) of the bill states:
1. In discharging their maritime security tasks private
maritime security guards shall use cameras and
microphones.
2. Audiovisual recordings must be made from the
moment there is a threat of piracy until such time the
threat has subsided or is deflected. The recordings
will be saved in files.18
The team leader has to hand over all video and audio
recordings to the master who, in turn, has to transfer
them to the public prosecutor as part of his duty to
report any threat or use of force or handcuffs. The pub-
lic prosecutor will then decide whether the use compor-
ted with the existing laws, particularly whether there
has been any violation of any criminal laws. If he has a
reasonable suspicion there has been such violation, he
may conduct further criminal investigation or bring
criminal charges. Prosecution may result in acquittal if
the court finds that the use of force comported with the
provisions of the bill. If the court so finds then, again,
such acquittal will not depend on the Criminal Code’s
self-defence provision. However, if the team leader,
master or PSC member failed to follow the rules of the
bill, they may invoke that provision to raise self-defence
as a defence. This is mainly a theoretical position
because the law imposes a higher duty of care on the
team leader.
To summarise, the use of force is governed by criminal
law with its top law enforcement officer – the prosecu-
tor. Once the bill becomes law, time will tell how this
system will work in practice. What is clear is that strict
regulation of the use of force in the cases where the bill
allows for the use of firearms is a reflection of a sensible
form of government control. It is an elaboration of the
state monopoly on force as well as a key feature of the
Dutch approach.
4.3 Master’s Role
Unsurprisingly, the master’s position and responsibili-
ties were a sensitive topic in the discussion which was
subject to much debate. In particular, the Dutch organi-
sation of masters was not as keen as vessel owners to
accept PSCs on board. On the one hand, the govern-
ment argued vessel masters could not be held responsi-
ble for everything that happens on board if PSCs are
engaged. On the other hand, it is clear that under inter-
national maritime law the master has a broad level of
responsibility. From a Dutch perspective, it is common
to vest military team leaders of a VPD with responsibili-
ty because they are military commanders under Dutch
law. In case of PSCs, there is the risk of ‘cowboys at sea’
and of a certain legal uncertainty about the master’s
role. The bill uses a dual approach when it states that
18. Parliamentary Papers I, 2017/18, 34 558, A.
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the maritime security guards are not allowed to use vio-
lence until their team leader orders them to do so,
unless such orders cannot reasonably be awaited. The
team leader may only order use of force after consulting
the master who must agree that passive and active anti-
piracy measures have failed to mitigate the risk of pira-
cy, unless they cannot reasonably engage in such consul-
tation or they cannot reasonably wait for its outcome.
Consequently, the bill expects the team leader and the
master to confer to a certain degree, but the extent to
which they have to confer in the light of the responsibil-
ities at stake is not completely clear. After reading this,
one might appreciate that a master will not feel entirely
comfortable and clear about his position and responsi-
bilities in this respect. The parliamentary debate pro-
vides more insight, stating:
The vessel owner and the master are responsible for
complying with the ILO’s Best Management Practi-
ces (‘BMPs’). Whenever a master engages the assis-
tance of armed private security guards, he will be
responsible for ensuring both before and during the
journey that any such active and passive protection
measures as could reasonably be adopted are in fact
adopted. These would include changing course,
increasing speed, using laser beams, water cannons,
barbwire, and so forth. The master is at all times
responsible for navigating and operating the vessel.
The team leader and the maritime security company
will be in charge of using force. The team leader, not
the master, will instruct them to do so.19
And:
And lastly, the master’s role. The private security
guards are personally responsible for their operations.
The master is not the one directing the team’s opera-
tions in threatening situations – that is the duty of the
team leader. However, the master will continue to
have overriding authority, as set forth in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The mas-
ter may use that authority, for instance, in the excep-
tional situation where he believes the team is using
disproportionate force.20
Let us analyse this from the perspective of criminal lia-
bility. For instance, if a PSC member shoots a pirate on
board a Dutch vessel, then arguably that member will be
liable. If he had not yet received any orders to use fire-
arms or any warnings and so on, then it may be safe to
conclude that he operated outside the scope of this
team’s duties. Again, he may raise the defence of self-
defence. Ordinarily, the team leader who ordered the
use of force will be the first to be held liable. Under
Dutch Criminal Procedure Law, the shooting and kill-
ing has to be reported to the prosecutor (accompanied
by video and audio footage). As such, the prosecutor has
discretion to decide who will be the (prime) target of
19. Parliamentary Reports II, 2017/18, 34 558, 57-32, 16.
20. Ibid., 24 and Parliamentary Reports I, 2018/19, 34 558, C, 3.
any criminal investigation or prosecution. The bill
seems to make the team leader the main target of the
criminal investigation, although it is clear that the mas-
ter in the end, bears full responsibility, not only under
criminal law but under civil law too for that matter.21 If
the master forbids the team leader to take any action, the
latter has to accept this decision of the former.22 The
master will only be held criminally liable if it is clear
that the PSC or its team leader made disproportionate
use of firearms and force, such that the master had a
duty to intervene with his overriding authority under
international maritime law, in the absence of which he
will be held liable.23 This will only happen under excep-
tional circumstances and therefore in rare cases only
(one must hope). This might be different, though, if the
circumstances under which the PSC had to work on
board, for which the master is responsible, were gener-
ally so bad and poor that they may have contributed to
the improper use of force. Poor overall conditions on
board the vessel where the PSC is deployed may even
reach a level where the vessel owner is so reckless that
he might be held criminally liable for the results of the
use of force too.
5 Conclusion
The bill for the Protection of Merchant Shipping Act
has, surprisingly, not that much been discussed by
Dutch legal commentators. As far as it is discussed
recently,24 the approach is accepted, although there is
discussion about the state responsibility under interna-
tional law.25 The bill has passed the two Houses of Par-
liament by March 2019 and is expected to come into
force somewhere in the future. In the intense discussion
in Parliament the debate centred on three substantive
issues.
The first point of debate is the substantive difference
between a VPD and a PSC. The Dutch Ministry of
Defense argues eleven people should be the minimum
number for an effective VPD. The average size of PSCs
is four persons. It was tried to explain this significant
difference by stating that VPDs have their own basic
medical care and operate differently. They operate from
several points on the vessel and not, as PSCs, from one
central position, which is often the bridge. In addition,
VPDs carry out all the security tasks themselves, where-
21. Parliamentary Reports I, 2018/19, 34 558, C, 5.
22. Ibid., F, 2.
23. This means that the above quote from the parliamentary debate (‘The
master may use that authority, for instance, in the exception situation
where he believes the team is using disproportionate force’) must be
read as stating that the master should use his authority under these
conditions.
24. C. Ryngaert, De nieuwe wet ter bescherming van koopvaardij, Ars
Aequi 2018/787.
25. Ibid., and L. Roorda, C. Ryngaert & B. Straeten, ‘Private beveiliging in
strijd tegen de piraterij: een onderzoek naar de aansprakelijkheid van
private beveiligers en de Staat’, in I. Giesen, J. Emaus & L. Enneking
(eds.), Verantwoordelijkheid, aansprakelijkheid en privatisering van
publieke taken (Den Haag, Boom, 2014), 165-188.
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as PSCs also engage the crew to be on the lookout, for
example. However, this does not explain the significant
difference completely. The question is whether PSCs
will exercise enough care and restraint in using propor-
tionate force or avoiding it whenever possible. This is an
important argument of the Dutch ‘VPD, unless …’
model, an approach that assumes a certain compatibility
and equality in the level of protection and guarantees
between VPDs and PSCs.
The second point is also connected to this ‘VPD, unless
…’ approach. One of the main categories in which a
PSC might be allowed is – as mentioned earlier – the
category of transports connected with the spot market.
Here, insufficient flexibility of VPDs is the main reason
for engaging PSCs. Against this background, the ‘VPD,
unless …’ approach seems somewhat ironic because the
merchant sector represents seventy-five per cent of the
spot market.26 In theory, if PSC might be used for all
transports in this spot market, PSCs may become the
rule rather than the exception.
The third issue is about the master’s role and responsi-
bilities. Notwithstanding a certain level of ‘understand-
ing’ between the master and the team leader on the
necessity of the use of force that the bill provides for
and the explanation on this point in the parliamentary
discussions, as quoted previously, it is still not com-
pletely clear who ultimately bears responsibility and
what he is responsible for. Under the general approach
of maritime law, there can be hardly any discussion
about the overall authority and ultimate responsibility of
the master. But is he (or should he be) responsible for
PSC’s use of force against pirates?
If the bill ultimately passes, it will still take some time
before the first PSC boards a Dutch vessel. Further reg-
ulations have to be made and have to be approved, and
several entities have to discharge their duties under the
Act. And even then the Netherlands’ stance on private
armed guards on board Dutch vessels will still be
ambivalent. It has emphasised the importance of the
state monopoly on force. However, private entities can-
not use the legitimate force used by the state. Although
this principle is not insurmountable, it calls for
restraint. The monopoly on force as a theoretical argu-
ment has been supported by the Dutch Royal Marine’s
practical experience in offering significant on-call assis-
tance to vessel owners to protect their vessels. And
although the political stance has changed over the years
– giving more weight to protecting vital economic inter-
ests – the approach is still a public law-oriented system
of strict ex ante and ex post control. Under the ‘VPD,
unless …’ approach, PSCs are only accepted under a
‘condition of subsidiarity’, to use EU terminology. It is
not for the vessel owner to decide whether he can use a
PSC. He needs permission per transport and must
accept a VPD, if available. Even when the Netherlands
have passed its PSC legislation, its approach will still
make its position unique as compared to the legislative
frameworks of other countries. Last, from a legal point
26. Parliamentary Papers II 2016/17, 34 558, 3, 6.
of view the ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating.’ Will
the Dutch law provide adequate control of the use of
private armed guards in general and in each case when
force is used, so as to comply with both the fundamental
principles of public law of the Netherlands and interna-
tional law, including human rights? But we may not get
to the pudding. Given the diminishing threat of piracy,
the debate – and the Act – may wither, ‘die in silence’.
As a Dutch newspaper stated previously after the bill
was accepted in (one of the Houses of) Parliament, ‘The
anti-piracy law is here but where are the pirates?’
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